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BRIDGING PRACTICE AND PROCESS RESEARCH TO STUDY 
TRANSIENT MANIFESTATIONS OF STRATEGY 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
At the intersection of Strategy Process (SP) and Strategy-as-Practice (SAP) research lies 
the focal phenomenon they share – strategy, which manifests itself in a variety of ways: intended, 
realized, deliberate, emergent, unrealized, and ephemeral strategy. We present a methodology 
comprised of three stages that, when integrated in the manner we suggest, permit a rich 
operationalization and tracking of strategy content for all manifestations. We illustrate the utility 
of our methodology for bridging SP and SAP research by theorizing practices that are more likely 
to give rise to unrealized and ephemeral strategy, identifying their likely consequences, and 
presenting a research agenda for studying these transient manifestations. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The relationship between Strategy Process (SP) and Strategy-as-Practice (SAP) research 
has been vigorously debated (see Hutzschenreuter & Kleindienst, 2006; Jarzabowski & Wilson, 
2002; Whittington, 2007), even though these two vibrant research traditions share a focal 
phenomenon – strategy. SP research “is essentially concerned with choice processes (strategic 
decision-making) and implementation processes (strategic change)” and the critical role played 
by time and history therein, with a special focus on “action and context” (Pettigrew, 1992: 6 & 
11). It emphasizes “three main elements: the strategists, the issue, and the sequence of actions” 
(Hutzschenreuter & Kleindienst, 2006: 676). SAP research represents “the study of strategy 
under the sociological eye” (Whittington, 2007: 1577) as an institutionalized social practice such 
that “the organization is de-centred, and people, practices and societies enter equally onto the 
stage” (Whittington, 2007: 1577 & 1578). It concerns itself with how things are done and by 
whom, emphasizing the people doing strategy work (practitioners) in their day-to-day activities 
(praxis), as well as the tools and methods (practices) they use i.e., “accepted ways of doing 
things, embodied and materially mediated, that are shared between actors and routinized over 
time” (Vaara & Whittington, 2012: 287).  
We explore the intersection between the two approaches and develop a robust, systematic 
and integrated methodology for tracking strategy content that can be used in empirical settings 
by researchers from both traditions for mutual benefit and cumulative advancement. This novel 
methodology consists of three stages. The first operationalizes Burgelman’s (1983) concept of 
strategy to capture strategy as discourse. The second stage captures strategy as action by finding 
common ground between Porter (1996) and Mintzberg (1978) to identify patterns over time. The 
third stage involves an analysis of strategic consonance and dissonance (Burgelman & Grove, 
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1996), allowing researchers to distinguish induced from autonomous activity (Burgelman, 1983; 
Floyd & Lane, 2000; Floyd & Wooldridge, 2000). In respecting the nuanced, complex and 
multifaceted nature of strategy, acknowledging that the concept carries multiple meanings 
(Ronda-Pupo & Guerras-Martin, 2012), and recognizing that strategy content manifests itself in 
multiple ways (Mintzberg & Waters, 1985), this methodology makes important contributions. 
First, our methodology allows researchers to track intended, deliberate, realized, 
unrealized, emergent (Mintzberg & Waters, 1985) and ephemeral (Mirabeau & Maguire, 2014) 
manifestations of strategy in a single study. This is critical because SP and SAP researchers are 
interested in the complexity and richness of strategy, and even researchers whose main interest is 
in a single manifestation can enrich their understanding by engaging with other manifestations 
because of the temporal and conceptual relationships among them. Second, our methodology is 
particularly useful for researchers to document and study unrealized and ephemeral strategy, 
which present significant methodological challenges because they unfold over just a short period 
of time and leave few traces. In providing a systematic and comprehensive way to track these 
transient manifestations, which have been largely ignored in the literature, our methodology 
overcomes the limitations of existing methods. In so doing, it lays the groundwork for SP and 
SAP researchers to develop a better understanding of transience in strategy content, which is also 
important for practitioners to learn how and why their strategic activity may fail to endure. Third, 
we make a conceptual contribution by illustrating how our methodology can be applied to study 
the transient manifestations of strategy. We do so by combining it with the variation-selection-
retention (V-S-R) framework that is well established in the SP literature (Barnett & Burgelman, 
1996; Burgelman, 1996), and with insights about practices from SAP researchers. In this way, 
we are able to theorize practices that are more likely to give rise to the two transient 
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manifestations of strategy, as well as identify their likely consequences for organizations. Our 
final contribution is to highlight the potential for bridging SP and SAP perspectives through this 
meta-analytical scheme based on the six different manifestations of strategy and the temporal 
and conceptual relations among them. In this way, we help strategy researchers meet their 
aspirations to “uncover the neglected, the unexpected and the unintended … to broaden radically 
our vision of what strategy is” (Whittington, 2007: 1577). 
The paper is organized as follows. Section One provides a brief overview of how SP and 
SAP studies have conceptualized strategy, and concludes by noting the methodological 
challenges facing researchers when studying the various manifestations of strategy. In Section 
Two, we present our methodology comprised of three integrated stages that, together, permit a 
rich operationalization of all six manifestations. In Section Three, we illustrate how our 
methodology can be used to study the particular cases of unintended and ephemeral strategy. We 
theorize the practices that are likely to give rise to these transient manifestations of strategy; 
discuss their consequences; and present a research agenda for advancing knowledge about them 
by leveraging our methodology in combination with other methods used by SP and SAP 
researchers. Finally, we review our contributions in the Conclusion.  
SECTION ONE: TWO TRADITIONS IN STRATEGY RESEARCH 
Strategy process research 
SP research “is concerned with understanding how organizational strategies are 
formulated and implemented and the processes of strategic change” (Van de Ven, 1992: 169). It 
developed in contrast to “the better established and more voluminous subfield of strategy content 
research” (Pettigrew, 1992: 6). The strategy content literature is concerned with theorizing 
positions that result in optimal performance in different competitive environments (Chakravarthy 
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& Doz, 1992), typically with reference to the concept of competitive advantage (Sminia & De 
Rond, 2012). In contrast, SP research is concerned with describing and explaining specific 
decision and event sequences, as well as the activities of strategists as they engage with issues, 
that give rise to continuity or change in strategy content over time (Pettigrew, 1992). 
One way of thinking about SP research is in terms of antecedents and outcomes, in 
addition to aspects of the strategy process itself (Hutzschenreuter & Kleindienst, 2006). Many 
studies explore links between specific strategy processes and the contextual factors and 
organizational characteristics that shape them as antecedents, or are, in turn, shaped by them as 
outcomes, including performance. Other studies explore the strategy process per se, opening this 
‘black box’ to describe the roles played by strategists’ personalities, characteristics, and 
cognitive frames as they interact with issues to shape which actions are taken and how events 
unfold as strategy is formulated and implemented (Hutzschenreuter & Kleindienst, 2006). 
One of the most significant contributions of SP research has been to problematize the 
distinction between formulation and implementation of particular strategy content. Mintzberg & 
McHugh’s (1985) work on strategy making at the National Film Board of Canada introduced the 
concept of emergent strategy to describe patterned organizational action over time in the absence 
of or even despite prior strategic intent. Mintzberg and Waters (1985) theorized four additional 
manifestations. Intended strategy i.e., those strategic actions planned by senior managers which, 
if they are translated successfully into sustained action, become deliberate strategy. In the event 
that they do not, perhaps because plans change or new projects meet resistance, the strategy is 
unrealized – a transient manifestation of strategy implying intended strategy content that does 
not endure in action. Realized strategy, which refers to patterned action over time regardless of 
its relationship to strategic intent, is the combination of deliberate and emergent strategy. 
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Other SP research has focused on the complex relationship between intent and action, 
documenting the important roles of iterated routines of resource allocation at different 
organizational levels, and generating an integrative SP framework which is commonly referred 
to as the Bower-Burgelman model (Bower, 1970; Bower & Gilbert, 2005; Burgelman, 1983, 
1985, 1994, 1996). This model distinguishes between organizational actions that are ‘induced’ 
from intended strategy and those that are not, which are termed ‘autonomous’. The former refers 
to projects undertaken in response to the strategic intent of top managers, whereas the latter 
refers to projects that, in challenging and diverging from prevailing ideas, are dissonant with 
strategic intent (Burgelman, 1983). Such autonomous strategic behavior is a necessary precursor 
to emergent strategy (Mirabeau & Maguire, 2014). However, just as not all intended strategy 
becomes realized, not all autonomous action endures to produce the pattern of sustained action 
that constitutes emergent strategy. Some autonomous strategic behavior fizzles and disappears, 
in which case the strategy is ephemeral (Mirabeau & Maguire, 2014). 
In sum, SP research has identified six different but interrelated manifestations of strategy 
(see Figure 1): intended, deliberate, emergent, realized and unrealized (Mintzberg & Waters, 
1985), as well as ephemeral (Mirabeau & Maguire, 2014).  
– Insert Figure 1 about here – 
Strategy as practice research  
Claims that SAP research is a subset of SP research (Hutzschenreuter & Kleindienst, 
2006) have been strongly disputed (Vaara & Whittington, 2012). Although both are concerned 
with strategy making, SAP research examines how managers strategize through day-to-day 
activities (Jarzabkowski, 2005; Whittington, 1996) and emphasizes the situated and interpretive 
nature of strategizing (Denis et al., 2007). Accordingly, strategy is something that practitioners 
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‘do’, rather than something that organizations ‘have’ (Hendry et al., 2010). Many SAP 
researchers are interested in the role of linguistic and communicative practices in strategy 
making, as a result of which SAP research often adopts a discursive lens (Fenton & Langley, 
2011; Laine & Vaara, 2007; Vaara et al., 2010). In doing so, it has further differentiated itself 
from SP research – strategy is not simply something made by practitioners and organizations; 
rather, strategy as a dominant discourse also ‘makes’ practitioners by reproducing itself as ‘truth’ 
and shaping managers’ subjectivities (Hardy & Thomas, 2014; Knights & Morgan, 1991). 
SAP research embraces an approach that is explicitly sociological – one that moves 
beyond methodological individualism (Vaara & Whittington, 2012) and traditional actor-centric 
views of relations among strategists, firms, and the environment – to consider an ontology of 
strategy that assumes its embeddedness in a wider societal context from which practices emanate 
(Ezzamel & Willmott, 2008; Jarzabkowski & Fenton, 2006; Seidl & Whittington, 2014). 
Prevailing organizational and societal practices, i.e., shared, accepted ways of doing things 
widely understood as ‘strategy’, enable and constrain strategy making not only through power 
effects on practitioners’ subjectivities, but also by shaping the material and symbolic artifacts 
with which they carry out the day-to-day work of strategizing (Whittington et al., 2006).  
SAP research can be broadly categorized around the techniques, tools, and methods used 
in strategy making (practices) by organizational members (practitioners) who engage in lived 
instances of routine and non-routine strategizing work on a day-to-day basis (praxis) (Vaara & 
Whittington, 2012). Despite the potential to connect practices, practitioners, and praxis to the 
dynamics of formation of particular strategy content in an explanatory way, SAP research has 
tended to focus on explaining other phenomena, such as identity, power, and resistance (e.g., 
Balogun et al., 2014; Hardy & Thomas, 2014; Mantere & Vaara, 2008). According to this work, 
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“strategy discourse does not just mirror reality, it creates it” (Suominen & Mantere, 2010: 215), 
enabling and constraining who people are and what they can become; and with organizational 
implications insomuch as routinized strategy talk reproduces a frame that delimits possibilities 
for experimentation in strategy making (Vaara et al., 2004).  
In sum, SAP research has significantly broadened the scope of strategy research through 
its interest in political struggles, strategy as discourse, and resistance (e.g., Erkama & Vaara, 
2010). It also brings “to light practices that have largely passed unnoticed, and discovering in 
them effects that previously were hardly imagined” (Vaara & Whittington, 2012: 298).  
Methodological challenges 
SP and SAP researchers face considerable methodological challenges if they wish to 
study all six manifestations of strategy. Reviews of SP research (Hutchenreuter & Kleindienst, 
2006) and SAP research (Vaara & Whittington, 2012) indicate that both streams of research tend 
to focus on intended and realized strategy, which are easier to study than other manifestations. 
Intended strategy can be identified by drawing on talk (including interviews) and texts (such as 
strategic plans) about intentions for the future (e.g., Spee & Jarzabkowski, 2011). Both 
interviews and plans are methodologically convenient artifacts for researchers to access. 
Realized strategy can be identified by drawing on retrospective interviews about what happened 
and/or organizational texts such as periodic reports that document previous actions (e.g., Regnér, 
2003; Liu & Maitlis, 2014), which are also methodologically convenient artifacts for researchers.  
The identification of other strategy manifestations is more complex. Deliberate strategy 
requires a comparison of actions that have been taken and sustained over time with prior 
discourse about planned actions in order to confirm that the sustained action was intended (e.g., 
Burgelman & Siegel, 2007). The identification of emergent strategy requires a similar 
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comparison of discourse about strategic intent from one point in time with subsequent patterns in 
action in order to establish an absence of correspondence between the two (e.g., Noda & Bower, 
1996). In other words, documenting deliberate and emergent strategy requires data about both 
discourse and action. The identification of unrealized and ephemeral strategy involves an even 
greater amount of methodological complexity owing to their transient nature. To ascertain 
unrealized strategy, researchers must compare discourse about strategic intent at one point in 
time with action that was planned but did not endure. Ephemeral strategy requires researchers to 
identify autonomous strategic behavior that does not endure. In the next section, we explain how 
our integrated methodology addresses these challenges. 
SECTION TWO: AN INTEGRATED METHODOLOGY FOR STUDYING STRATEGY 
There are two important rationales for developing our methodology. The first rationale is 
that both SP and SAP researchers can deepen their understanding by examining multiple 
manifestations. This is the case even for scholars whose main focus is on a single manifestation, 
because of the temporal and conceptual relations among the manifestations. For example, 
intended strategy is a precursor to both deliberate and unrealized strategy: to understand fully 
what happens to intended strategy requires researchers to establish the existence and nature of 
both. Similarly, realized strategy is made up of deliberate and emergent strategy. If we are to 
grasp how realized strategy comes into being, we need to explore whether and how it arises from 
deliberate action or emerges from unplanned action. Likewise, autonomous strategic behavior is 
a precursor to both emergent and ephemeral strategy, so documenting and comparing them offers 
more insight into the survival of autonomous projects. No current method is capable of tracking 
all six manifestations in a single study. As a result, the methodology we present here is an 
important aid to SP and SAP researchers.  
  11
The second rationale concerns the particular case of transient manifestations of strategy, 
which have been virtually ignored in the literature because of the methodological challenges they 
pose. As Mantere (2005: 160) points out: “the issue of thwarted [strategy] champions is largely 
unexplored.” This is a significant lacuna insofar as knowledge about what hinders or prevents 
strategic action from enduring is of considerable importance to practitioners and researchers 
alike; as is learning about whether and how transient strategies have organizational consequences 
despite their fleeting nature. In addition, insofar as SP and SAP researchers wish to identify and 
shed light upon neglected and less visible aspects of strategy making, the study of transient 
manifestations of strategy promises considerable theoretical insights. Our methodology 
overcomes limitations of existing methods in studying transient manifestations (as we 
demonstrate in this section), thus providing a basis for significant theoretical development in 
relation to practices giving rise to these manifestations, as well as their organizational 
consequences (as we elaborate in Section Three). 
Existing methods have significant shortcomings in relation to unrealized and ephemeral 
strategy. For example, interviewees could be asked to identify projects that ‘fail’ or were short-
lived. However, they may not be aware of all fleeting projects since, by their very nature, such 
projects engage fewer organizational members than those that endure. In particular, middle and 
top managers (who are often the focus of strategy research) may be completely unaware of 
autonomous strategic action taken by front line managers if it does not endure. Even if they are 
aware of fleeting projects, interviewees may not accurately recall all of them, or they may not be 
forthcoming about them since such projects are often associated with ‘failure’. Also, different 
interviewees might understand ‘fleeting’ differently and offer up inconsistent lists of projects. 
Finally, accurately distinguishing autonomous from induced projects requires interviewees to 
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know the intended strategy at the time of the project’s inception, which may have been long 
before the interview. They may be unable to recall the original intended strategy or may confuse 
the current intended strategy with the original one. Ethnographic techniques – following projects 
in ‘real time’ through participant observation – are also problematic. It is unlikely that the 
researcher will be aware of or have the time to follow all strategic projects. Further, the ones they 
follow may not turn out to be fleeting. In sum, existing methods are unlikely to produce a 
comprehensive documentation of unrealized and ephemeral strategy. 
To develop our methodology, we build upon foundational research: Mintzberg’s 
conceptualization of strategy as patterned action and the Bower-Burgelman model of strategy as 
iterated resource allocation (Bower, 1970; Burgelman, 1983; Noda & Bower, 1996). The 
methodology comprises three stages. The first stage operationalizes the concept of strategy by 
documenting it in terms of empirical strategic categories prevailing at a given time, and tracks 
strategy as discourse to capture intended strategy. The second stage tracks strategy as action in 
terms of empirical strategic projects and permits the identification of realized strategy by 
operationalizing patterns over time in a transparent, rigorous way. The third stage involves an 
analysis of consonance and dissonance between discourse and action to distinguish induced from 
autonomous projects, thus permitting the identification of deliberate, emergent, unrealized and 
ephemeral strategy. By carrying out all three stages, researchers can systematically ascertain the 
six manifestations of strategy, while respecting the richness of their qualitative data (Table 1). 
- Insert Table 1 about here - 
Stage 1: Tracking strategy as discourse to ascertain intended strategy  
Tracking strategy as discourse allows researchers to ascertain an organization’s intended 
strategy. Increasingly, strategic management scholars are seeking to “understand strategies as 
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discursive constructions created in complex ongoing sense making processes…These 
constructions can thus be seen as stabilizations of specific organizational intentions” (Vaara et 
al., 2004: 1). With its emphasis on the ideational realm and intentions, this approach to 
understanding strategy is well suited to exploring strategy as a plan, i.e., intended strategy 
(Mintzberg, 1978, 1987). In discussing intended strategy, Burgelman (1983: 66) refers to the 
“concept of strategy”, which represents “the more or less explicit articulation of the firm’s [or 
other type of organization’s] theory about its past concrete achievement” while providing a basis 
for “continuity in strategic activity” by inducing “further strategic initiative in line with it.” It is 
made up of an ensemble of strategic categories that practitioners use to make sense of the 
organization and its environment (Burgelman, 1983), as well as link the organization’s past, 
present, and future in a coherent way (Kaplan & Orlikowski, 2013). This first stage of our 
methodology tracks an organization’s concept of strategy by identifying the categories used by 
top managers of the focal organization(s) to talk about their firm’s corporate, business, and 
operational strategies, in each time period under consideration. Tracking all three levels (i.e., 
corporate, business, and operational) over time, it surfaces a comprehensive set of strategic 
categories that reflect what managers talk about as they formulate intended strategy. 
Tracking strategy as discourse to characterize an organization’s intended strategy 
involves two steps. In the first step, researchers must determine the unit of time t, i.e., they need 
to define the temporal coarseness of grain for the study (yielding t = 1, 2, 3, … T, where T is the 
overall number of periods in the study). Researchers must also identify and collect a set of top 
management or organization level texts that, ideally, are produced in a recurring way in each 
time slice. Examples of such texts include strategic plans, planning documents, annual reports, 
employee newsletters, and investor communications since these documents are typically 
  14
produced cyclically for internal and external audiences. In practice, the availability and 
accessibility of organizational texts and the periodicity with which they are produced affects 
researchers’ determination of the coarseness of grain for their study.  
In the second step, these texts are coded for themes relating to strategy content associated 
with each of the three strategy levels and for each period of the study. Here, researchers can 
adopt an inductive approach that allows for strategic categories to emerge from codes anchored 
in the data as would be expected in grounded theory building (cf. Mirabeau & Maguire, 2014). 
Alternatively, researchers can adopt a more deductive approach by pre-determining categories 
from a literature review or by drawing on existing typologies and categorization schemes. As an 
example, a study choosing to impose strategic categories on the data could potentially track 
corporate level strategies using categories (Ci) from Ansoff’s (1965) matrix (i.e., market 
penetration, market development, product development, and diversification); and business level 
strategies using categories (Bj) from Porter’s (1980) generic strategies (i.e. cost leadership, 
differentiation and niche). Operational (or functional) level strategies could be tracked using 
categories (Fk) from typologies addressing one or more of the components of an organization’s 
value chain, i.e., inbound logistics, operations, marketing and sales, service, infrastructure, 
human resources management, technology, and procurement (Porter, 1980). For example, 
operational level strategies for marketing and sales could be tracked using strategic categories 
related to the four P’s of marketing – product, price, place, and promotion (McCarthy, 1960). 
Regardless of whether categories emerge from inductive coding or are deduced from 
theory, this analysis yields a set of strategic categories to be tracked over time: Ci, with i = 1, 2, 
… I, where I represents the total number of strategic categories related to corporate strategy; Bj, 
with j = 1, 2, … J, where J represents the total number of strategic categories related to business 
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strategy; and Fk, with k = 1, 2, … K, where K represents the total number of strategic categories 
related to operational strategy. Coding of the data allows researchers to capture a cross-sectional 
view of the prevailing concept of strategy by representing the n = 1 to N strategic categories at a 
given time t, where N = I + J + K; as well as a longitudinal view capturing the presence or 
absence of a single strategic category n in the prevailing concept of strategy for all times t =1 to 
T, where T is the number of time periods in the study. It also allows researchers to construct a 
longitudinal view of the overall concept of strategy (Burgelman, 1983, 2011), represented by a 
two-dimensional array of T columns (the number of time periods), by N rows (the number of 
distinct strategic categories covering all three hierarchical levels of strategy). See Figure 2. 
- Insert Figure 2 about here - 
This stage of the methodology accomplishes two important things. First, it formalizes a 
way of identifying the concept of strategy of an organization at any given time during the period 
of study, providing a systematic way of tracking intended strategy. Second, it captures all three 
hierarchical levels of strategy, allowing researchers to view strategy formation across different 
layers in order to understand top-down and bottom-up dynamics of strategy formation.1  
Stage 2: Tracking strategy as action to ascertain realized strategy 
Tracking strategy as action or activities to document patterns over time (Mintzberg, 
1978) allows researchers to ascertain realized strategy. Porter (1996: 62) argues that activities are 
the basic unit of competitive advantage, and views “strategic positioning as performing different 
activities from rivals or performing similar activities in different ways.” The distinctiveness of an 
                                                      
1 In its generalized form, this stage of our methodology does not prescribe whether the contents of the array are 
qualitative or quantitative or, in the case of the latter, whether the quantities tracked in the cells of the array are 
treated as discrete or continuous variables, thus leaving maximum flexibility in its implementation. It is possible, 
then, that our methodology may have benefits for quantitative, as well as qualitative, research although this is not 
something we have been able to explore within the confines of this paper. 
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organization’s strategy thus comes from choosing a unique combination of activities. This 
definition of strategy is appealing to researchers who are looking to operationalize the concept at 
a micro-level of analysis, as it implies that tracking strategy involves examining the introduction, 
maintenance, evolution, and disappearance of particular activities in an organization.  
Porter’s (1996) approach highlights that strategy is about combining activities, which 
suggests a link between his view of strategy as a portfolio of activities and Mintzberg’s (1978) 
view of strategy as a pattern in action. The main difference between the two views rests with the 
relationship to time as a variable. Porter’s approach focuses on the mix of activities at a given 
time, while Mintzberg’s approach views strategy as a pattern, which unfolds over time. We see 
fertile common ground between Porter and Mintzberg’s definitions: together they suggest 
viewing – and tracking – strategy as a portfolio of activities evolving over time.  
In some cases, tracking activities may prove difficult. Indeed, activities may be singular 
acts by individuals, which may require such finely-grained data collection as to be impractical. 
We, therefore, suggest that researchers operationalize activities evolving over time by tracking 
the implementation of strategic projects i.e., bundles of purposeful activities with stated 
objectives. Tracking strategic projects in this way is consistent with the literature on emergent 
strategy (Mintzberg, 1978; Mintzberg & McHugh, 1985) and resource allocation (Burgelman, 
1985; Noda & Bower, 1996), as well as the SAP literature (Kaplan, 2011; Sillince et al., 2012). 
Tracking strategy as action involves two steps. The first step concerns the identification 
of strategic projects in place at a given time t. At a conceptual level, a strategic project can be 
understood as purposeful activity undertaken towards stated objectives and spanning one or more 
strategy levels (i.e., corporate, business, operational). In terms of data, what is required are texts 
from lower levels of the organization that contain traces of projects ongoing or already 
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accomplished, such as operators’ reports, output and activity records, or performance summaries.  
The second step involves tracking projects over time by identifying the time period of the 
project’s inception and assessing whether the project endures over a number of consecutive 
periods. This way, realized strategy is determined by projects resulting in patterned action over 
time (Mintzberg, 1978; 1987). It is important to note that the operationalization of whether 
actions endure or whether they are fleeting is likely to vary across studies. One way to assess the 
appropriateness of a particular granularity in measuring time is to consider the cycle for new 
product development. For example, studies of telecommunications companies, which engage in 
fast development cycles and regularly experience new product generations (Burgelman, 1994; 
Noda & Bower, 1996), should operationalize ‘enduring’ using a small number of finely-grained 
time slices. A recent study by Mirabeau and Maguire (2014) considered projects to be enduring 
when there was clear evidence of project activity in four or more consecutive six-month time 
periods. Studies of companies in industries where the pace of change is slower might 
operationalize ‘enduring’ using either larger time slices or a larger number of small time slices. 
In this way, researchers should decide upon a temporal threshold for declaring a project to be 
enduring that is in line with the organization being studied, and operationalize it accordingly in 
terms of the appropriate granularity and number of time slices.   
Formalizing this analysis, from step one we obtain a set of r projects:  P1, P2, …, PR, 
where R represents the total number of projects. With step two we obtain two time identifiers for 
each project. The first time stamp – ti – denotes the time period for the project’s inception, while 
the second date – te – reports on the end of the project, which occurs not when activities are 
embedded into routine organizational functioning but, rather, when activities are no longer 
performed, i.e., when they are halted and the project’s objective is no longer sought. For 
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example, a project of entering a new market with an existing product (i.e., a corporate strategy) 
would be considered to endure until the point when the firm withdraws the product from the 
market. This yields the set of projects: Pr =1toR = P1(ti1,te1), P2(ti2,te2), … PR(tiR,teR). 
This stage of the methodology provides a systematic way of tracking realized strategy 
(Mintzberg & Waters, 1985). It highlights an approach for operationalizing and tracking 
activities via strategic projects, which we see as common methodological ground for SP 
researchers (e.g., Burgelman, 1983; Floyd & Wooldridge, 1992; Schilling & Hill, 1998) and SAP 
researchers (e.g., Kaplan, 2011; Kaplan & Orlikowski, 2013; Sillince et al., 2012). In addition, it 
encourages scholars to be transparent in their methods as to what counts as a ‘pattern over time’ 
(Mintzberg, 1978) by tracking both project inception and end, and by clearly stating how they 
distinguish between enduring and fleeting projects. This emphasis is thus a subtle yet important 
mechanism for enhancing comparability across studies.  
Stage 3: Identifying consonance and dissonance  
The third stage of our methodology captures the alignment – or lack thereof – between 
strategy as discourse about intent and what is actually accomplished via strategic action. To do 
so, the analysis discerns the strategic consonance or dissonance (Burgelman, 1983; Burgelman & 
Grove, 1996) of projects and ascertains whether or not the projects endure to establish a pattern 
over time (Mintzberg, 1978). It features four steps that build on the earlier stages of the 
methodology i.e., it assumes that the set of all strategic categories for all time periods, as well the 
set of all projects, along with their points of inception and duration, have been identified. 
Step one consists of identifying the subset of strategic categories that characterizes the 
prevailing concept of strategy during the particular time period of inception of a given project, 
from stages one and two above. Step two consists of assessing how the project relates to each of 
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these strategic categories, as: (1) consonant, where activities undertaken for the project are 
interpreted as being consistent with the categories; (2) dissonant, where activities undertaken for 
the project are interpreted as being inconsistent with the categories; or (3) unrelated, where 
activities undertaken for the project are neither clearly consistent nor inconsistent with the 
categories. Evaluating the consonance or dissonance of a project with prevailing strategic 
categories involves interpretation and, therefore, transparency at this step is vital in establishing a 
rigorous and credible study. Techniques such as using multiple coders and confirming inter-
coder reliability, having informants verify coders’ interpretations, and triangulating conclusions 
of consonance or dissonance with interview data can help to improve reliability. 
Step three consists of classifying the project as induced when the project and the concept 
of strategy prevailing at its inception are deemed consonant or, conversely, autonomous when 
they are not. Induced strategic behavior is activity that is consistent with intended strategy, while 
autonomous strategic behavior is at odds with it (cf. Burgelman, 1983). Transparency is also 
important at this step. For example, researchers might declare a project to be autonomous when it 
is not deemed consonant with any of the strategic categories prevailing at its inception (i.e., in 
the absence of consonance); or, they may be more conservative and only identify a project as 
autonomous when it is deemed dissonant with one or more categories (i.e. in the presence of 
dissonance). Neither approach is, a priori, superior to the other since their appropriateness 
depends upon the study’s objective. By being explicit about their approach, however, researchers 
can not only ensure transparency, but also document the degree and nature of an autonomous 
project’s dissonance by counting and noting the specific categories with which it is dissonant. 
Step four consists of characterizing deliberate and unrealized strategy in terms of induced 
projects, and emergent and ephemeral strategy in terms of autonomous projects. Induced projects 
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that endure beyond the temporal threshold established in the second stage constitute deliberate 
strategy, while induced projects that do not endure constitute unrealized strategy. Similarly, 
autonomous projects that endure beyond the temporal threshold established in the second stage 
constitute emergent strategy, while autonomous projects that do not endure beyond this threshold 
constitute ephemeral strategy.  
In sum, SP and SAP researchers can systematically and robustly ascertain all six 
manifestations of strategy in a single study and characterize them in terms of strategic projects 
by using our integrated methodology. Figure 3 provides an illustration of our methodology 
applied to a situation where there were nine strategic projects – six were induced (P1, P2, P4, P7, 
P8, P9) and three were autonomous (P3, P5, P6). Four of the induced projects endured sufficiently 
to be considered realized, becoming deliberate strategy (P1, P2, P7, P9), while two autonomous 
projects were also realized, becoming emergent strategy (P5, P6). Three projects failed to endure 
past the temporal threshold of which two were classified as unrealized strategy (P4, P8) because 
they were induced, and one as ephemeral (P3) because it was an autonomous project.  
- Insert Figure 3 about here - 
In addition to documenting all manifestations of strategy, our methodology overcomes 
the shortcomings of other qualitative methods in systematically and comprehensively 
documenting unrealized and ephemeral strategy. By drawing from textual data produced at 
multiple levels in the organization, which can also be triangulated with interview data, it is more 
likely to generate a comprehensive inventory of strategic projects than other methods, ensuring 
that fleeting projects are identified. The methodology also prompts researchers to establish and 
operationalize a temporal threshold appropriate to their study in a rigorous way and to use it 
consistently throughout their data analysis to designate a project as fleeting or not. In 
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operationalizing the concept of strategy by coding textual data to identify strategic categories and 
how they change over time, and in documenting the date of the project’s inception from textual 
data, it helps researchers to compare the project with the intended strategy at the time of its 
inception accurately. This allows researchers to establish the consonance or dissonance of a 
given strategic project with strategic intent and, in turn, to distinguish accurately between 
induced and autonomous projects. In the next section, we illustrate the utility of applying our 
methodology to the two transient manifestations, i.e. unrealized and ephemeral strategy.   
SECTION THREE: STUDYING TRANSIENT MANIFESTATIONS OF STRATEGY 
Our methodology is particularly useful for studying the transient manifestations – i.e., 
unrealized and ephemeral strategy – in a way that bridges SP and SAP research. We illustrate its 
utility in this section by combining it with the evolutionary or ‘Variation-Selection-Retention’ 
(V-S-R) strategy making approach (Barnett & Burgelman, 1996; Burgelman, 1996). The link 
between the V-S-R approach and SP research is well established (e.g., Henderson & Stern, 
2004), having first been made by Burgelman (1983) and further developed with his work on the 
intraorganizational ecology of strategy making (Burgelman, 1991). The link to SAP research is, 
however, not so well established, despite the benefit to be derived from using the V-S-R 
framework to explore how strategy practices relate to different manifestations of strategy. 
Specifically, strategic change requires variation in content, which can originate in the realm of 
sanctioned organizational discourse as planned top-down change, or in the realm of action as a 
novel but unsanctioned bottom-up project. In addition, the variation must be selected for 
resourcing by practitioners at multiple organizational levels and retained through the alteration 
of strategic and structural contexts in ways consistent with the change. If variations are not 
selected and/or retained, intended strategic change becomes unrealized, and novel autonomous 
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projects become ephemeral. Below, we show how the combination of our methodology and the 
V-S-R framework can be used to identify practices that give rise to unrealized and ephemeral 
strategy, as well as their organizational consequences.  
Studying practices giving rise to unrealized strategy 
Intended strategy is a precursor to unrealized strategy and deliberate strategy, which 
raises the question: which features of strategy making influence whether strategic intent has a 
higher likelihood of being frustrated – and becoming unrealized strategy – rather than being 
implemented to become part of the deliberate strategy component of realized strategy? This is of 
particular interest to researchers and practising managers who, naturally, are interested in 
knowing more about why ‘the best laid plans’ sometimes fail to materialize. Viewed in terms of 
the V-S-R framework, the production of intended strategy comprising change represents a 
variation from prevailing strategic categories which, if selected and retained, results in the 
intended strategic change becoming realized. In the case of unrealized strategy, projects induced 
from novel strategic categories in the realm of discourse fail to take hold to become realized 
strategy in the realm of action. Thus the variation is not selected and retained.  Restated in terms 
of the V-S-R framework, the key question becomes: how do particular strategy practices 
contribute to the non-selection or non-retention of top-down change projects induced from 
variation in strategic intent?  
Our methodology is well-suited to addressing this question since it documents – at the 
level of finely-grained categories – the variation in content that constitutes a change in intended 
strategy, as well as the subsequent non-selection and non-retention of projects induced by the 
variation i.e., unrealized strategy. By examining the relationship between intended and 
unrealized strategy, our methodology can be used to identify and investigate the role of specific 
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strategy practices in producing unrealized strategy.  
The existing SAP literature provides an indication of specific practices that could be 
studied in this way. For example, the wide involvement of practitioners across multiple 
organizational levels in strategic planning and their inclusion in vertical and lateral dialogue have 
been found to generate strategy content that is more likely to be successfully implemented (Floyd 
& Wooldridge, 2000; Laine & Vaara, 2007; Mintzberg, 1994). Intended variations are more 
likely to be realized when practices generate feelings of inclusion and empowerment (Westley, 
1990; Wooldridge & Floyd, 1990), managerial commitment (Dooley et al., 2000), and 
motivation (Burgelman, 2016). It therefore seems likely that practices characterized by narrow, 
limited participation and dialogue are more likely to generate unrealized strategy insofar as 
lower and middle managers are disinclined to select and retain strategic content forced on them.  
Open-ended, flexible planning aimed at generating multiple, possible scenarios is also 
likely to lead to unrealized strategy. SAP research has problematized the widespread assumption 
that strategic planning is always a rational, top-down exercise aimed at generating plans that are 
expected to be fully and completely implemented. Rather, planning can be viewed as an 
opportunity for creativity and the generation of multiple possible intended futures or scenarios 
(Giraudeau, 2008). Insofar as the introduction of novel categories serves as experimentation, 
with full expectation that not all aspects of a plan will be acted upon (Giraudeau, 2008) and 
managers will adapt to new realities in the realm of action (Jarzabkowski, 2008) by amending 
plans (Spee & Jarzabkowski, 2011), more intended variations will be generated but they will be 
less likely to be selected and retained, resulting in unrealized strategy.  
How strategy is ‘consumed’ may also influence whether it is more likely to be 
successfully implemented. Suominen and Mantere (2010) show that managers may consume 
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strategy instrumentally, by translating intended strategy content into a series of sub-strategies 
aimed at ensuring that sub-units align themselves with the intended strategy, thereby increasing 
the chances that intended variations will be selected and retained. Conversely, the playful 
consumption of intended strategy appears more likely to result in unrealized strategy. ‘Serious 
play’ (see Statler, Heracleous & Jacobs, 2011) can complement more traditional processes of 
strategy development (e.g., Roos et al., 2004) and, therefore, it is important not to equate play 
with resistance. That said, in some situations a playful stance can lead individuals to become 
critical of intended strategy through ridicule, parody or irony: “the playful tactic embodies a 
critique and resistance toward strategy and its methods, which can be read as a sign of cynicism 
from the managers … [It] resists and subverts strategy implicitly and quietly on its own terms” 
(Suominen & Mantere, 2010: 234). If playful practices do take the form of resistance, they can 
derail a strategic initiative or result in outcomes far removed from those intended (Balogun et al., 
2011; Laine &Vaara, 2007; Mantere & Vaara, 2008).  
Our methodology also documents the selection and retention of projects that constitute 
realized strategy and distinguishes between those induced from intended strategy (i.e., the 
deliberate component of realized strategy) and those originating as autonomous, bottom-up 
projects (i.e., the emergent component of realized strategy). Induced and autonomous projects 
typically compete for limited resources. Consequently, practices for allocating resources to one 
project over another can play an important role in facilitating unrealized strategy. Resource 
allocation practices that allow deviations from plans appear more likely to result in strategy 
being unrealized. For example, middle managers at Intel championed an emergent strategy of 
microprocessors over the intended DRAM strategy (Burgelman, 2002a, 2002b). They neutralized 
Intel’s ‘Commitment to DRAM’ category by constructing another category – ‘Maximizing 
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Margins’ – such that resources flowed to autonomous projects for microprocessors, which were 
the higher margin products, rather than induced projects for DRAM. This non-selection of 
DRAM projects meant that, over time, this intended strategy became an unrealized strategy.  
Research agenda  
The SAP literature provide us with a preliminary set of practices that appear likely to be 
associated with unrealized strategy. Of particular interest here is SAP research drawing on 
discourse analysis to highlight that the discursive dynamics of both producing and consuming 
intended strategy content can shape action and resource allocation (e.g. Laine & Vaara, 2007; 
Suominen & Mantere, 2010; Mirabeau & Maguire, 2014). However, more research is needed to 
ascertain whether and how specific practices account for unrealized strategy. Given the practical 
and theoretical importance of understanding why strategic plans are not implemented in an 
enduring way, our methodology can serve as the basis for research designed to identify and 
investigate the practices that produce unrealized strategy. By combining our methodology for 
tracking strategy content with discourse analysis as well other methods (e.g. interviews, 
participant observation, ethnographies) that are commonly used in SP and SAP research to study 
how, why and by whom strategy content is made, researchers will be able to identify and explore 
the mechanisms through which specific content goes unrealized.  
As a first step, our methodology should be used to document intended strategy (since it is 
a precursor to unrealized strategy) in terms of strategic categories; and to ascertain strategic 
projects induced from it by verifying their consonance with these categories. It is then important 
to establish a temporal threshold to operationalize and distinguish induced projects that endure 
(which represent deliberate strategy) from induced projects that are fleeting (which represent 
unrealized strategy). As discussed above, the appropriate period of time to use will vary 
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according to the industry under consideration. Having identified a particular induced but fleeting 
project, researchers then, in a second step, should collect and analyze data about the specific 
practices associated with it over its short life cycle – a step we refer to as constructing a project’s 
‘practice history’. This history might document the specific practices used to produce the 
intended strategy, communicate it to middle and front line managers, consume and translate it 
into the induced project, champion the project, etc., depending upon the researcher’s focus. 
Subsequent analysis could be carried out by comparing the practice histories of multiple 
induced but fleeting projects to ascertain commonalities. If certain practices feature in multiple 
short histories, they are likely to be implicated in the non-selection and non-retention of these 
projects and, hence, to account for the production of unrealized strategy. To explore further, 
researchers could then construct practice histories for induced projects that endured to become 
deliberate strategy, and compare them with those for the induced but fleeting projects that make 
up unrealized strategy, to ascertain differences. It is important to note that, since the interest is on 
unrealized strategy, only the practice history from the early days of enduring projects is relevant, 
i.e., practices enacted prior to the temporal threshold used to declare the project an enduring one. 
If practices associated with the histories of fleeting projects making up unrealized strategy differ 
from those associated with the early histories of enduring projects making up deliberate strategy, 
then the case for concluding that the former lead to unrealized strategy is strengthened. 
Another angle of investigation involves using practice histories to analyze interactions 
among projects by leveraging our methodology’s ability to highlight relations among different 
manifestations of strategy. For example, if bottom-up autonomous projects are resourced at the 
expense of top-down induced projects, the former are more likely to endure to become emergent 
strategy, while the latter – starved of resources – become unrealized strategy. Our methodology 
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allows researchers to identify autonomous projects that endure, for which practice histories could 
be constructed and compared with those of induced but fleeting projects, to reveal whether and 
how resource allocation practices shape the divergent fates of the induced and autonomous 
projects. Another possibility is that specific practices of manipulating strategic context and 
altering structural context to help autonomous projects to become emergent strategy may have 
unintended consequences in terms of rendering these contexts less hospitable to induced projects 
despite the latter’s consonance with intended strategy, again resulting in unrealized strategy. In 
documenting projects associated with each manifestation of strategy, our methodology helps 
researchers to identify appropriate comparison projects whose practice histories will be most 
revelatory for understanding unrealized strategy.  
Studying practices giving rise to ephemeral strategy 
Ephemeral strategy arises when autonomous strategic behavior i.e., unsanctioned projects 
at odds with prevailing strategic categories, fail to take hold and endure. Autonomous strategic 
behavior is a precursor to both ephemeral and emergent strategy, which raises the following 
question: what features of strategy making influence whether and how projects at odds with 
intended strategy are more likely to be abandoned – and become ephemeral strategy – rather than 
enduring to become part of the emergent strategy component of realized strategy? This is of 
particular interest to researchers and practising managers, especially those championing bottom-
up change who, naturally, are interested in knowing more about what they can do to influence 
their organization’s strategy. Viewed in terms of the V-S-R framework, ephemeral strategy arises 
when the variation stemming from an autonomous project is not selected and retained. In the 
event that such variation is selected and retained, the result is emergent strategy. As we show 
here, if we use our methodology to examine the relationships among the different manifestations 
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of strategy, we are in a position to identify and investigate the practices that are likely to give rise 
to ephemeral strategy. Restated in terms of the V-S-R framework, the key question becomes: 
how do particular strategy practices contribute to the non-selection or non-retention of bottom-up 
change projects arising from variation in autonomous strategic behavior?  
Our methodology is well-suited to addressing this question since it documents – at the 
level of finely-grained categories – the variation in content that constitutes novel autonomous 
strategic behaviour as well as the nature of its dissonance with intended strategy. Such 
autonomous variations may arise from adaptive responses to intended strategy, such as inductive 
practices that encourage exploration, experiments, and trial and error to generate new strategic 
knowledge from the organizational periphery (Regnér, 2003), or from practices to resist intended 
strategy that serve as the basis for “autonomous strategic development work” unsupported by 
corporate management discourse (Laine & Vaara, 2007: 47).  
Having established the existence of autonomous projects as well as identifying how they 
are dissonant with intended strategy, researchers can use our methodology to document whether 
these variations are subsequently selected and/or retained, thereby providing a basis for 
investigating the role of specific strategy practices in producing ephemeral strategy. Again, the 
existing SAP literature provides an indication of specific practices that could be studied in this 
way. For example, autonomous projects may have a higher likelihood of being abandoned to 
become ephemeral strategy if their content is directly contradictory to intended strategy rather 
than merely tangential to it. Tangential content emanating from autonomous projects is easier to 
select and retain because its dissonance with intended strategy can be eliminated by ‘stretching’ 
existing strategic categories (i.e., reconstructing them in ways that facilitate the eventual 
interpretation of autonomous projects as consonant with them) or by adding new ones. If this 
  29
occurs, emergent strategy will result (cf. Mirabeau & Maguire, 2014). In contrast, contradictory 
content is too dissonant with intended strategy to be accommodated by manipulating strategic 
context: existing categories can only be stretched so far, while adding new but contradictory 
categories undermines the intended strategy. As a result, variation in bottom-up action that is 
directly contradictory, rather than merely tangential, to intended strategy is unlikely to be 
selected and retained and, therefore, is more likely to become ephemeral. 
Autonomous projects whose variation is born of resistant practices seem more likely to 
become ephemeral than those whose variation derives from inductive, adaptive practices. In 
seeking to counter intended strategy, resistant practices are more likely to generate variation that 
is directly contradictory to it, which makes the selection and retention of these autonomous 
projects less likely as noted above. Non-selection and non-retention of such projects are not 
inevitable, however. Some researchers (Ford, Ford & D’Amelio, 2008; Piderit, 2000) argue that 
resistance can be incorporated into and be used to improve upon top-down change initiatives, 
particularly when intended strategy is characterized by high ambiguity (e.g., Eisenberg, 1984). 
Accordingly, researchers need to examine resistance carefully to ascertain whether it is 
‘oppositional’ or ‘facilitative’ (Thomas, Sargent & Hardy, 2011). The former appears more 
likely to result in ephemeral strategy, whereas the latter does not. 
Our methodology also documents the selection and retention of projects that constitute 
realized strategy, distinguishing between deliberate and emergent components. In this way, it can 
be used to identify and investigate further practices that are likely to lead to ephemeral strategy. 
Emergent strategy arises when autonomous projects are selected and retained, which means that 
they have been successful in securing resources. This outcome is more likely when resource 
allocation practices allow for flexibility so that unplanned projects can be funded. Conversely, 
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resource allocation practices that discourage deviations from plans may increase the chances 
that bottom-up variations become ephemeral strategy. Such practices make it difficult for 
managers to divert funding from sanctioned, induced projects to unsanctioned autonomous ones, 
leading to the latter’s non-selection and non-retention and, hence, ephemeral strategy.  
More generally, recursive rather than adaptive practices are likely to result in ephemeral 
strategy. These practices encourage “a unified conception of strategy through the dissemination 
of information i.e., objective knowledge, through pre-defined methods of giving feedback and 
through the operationalization of strategy into explicit targets” (Mantere, 2005: 169). Adaptive 
practices, in contrast, stress “interactive impromptu discussions concerning strategy, continuous 
negotiation of responsibility”, and control via social networks rather than formal resource 
allocation and performance evaluation (p. 175). Recursive practices make it more difficult for 
champions of a bottom-up variation to mobilize resources for their autonomous projects, to 
access the relevant decision arenas to manipulate strategic context, and to alter structural context. 
Consequently, their autonomous projects are less likely to be selected and retained – becoming 
ephemeral rather than taking hold as emergent strategy (Mirabeau & Maguire, 2014).  
Research agenda  
SAP research provides a preliminary set of practices that appear likely to be associated 
with ephemeral strategy. Of particular interest here is SAP research drawing on narrative 
analysis of interviews as well as discourse analysis to highlight that particular practices 
differentially enable and constrain both the launching and championing of autonomous projects 
(e.g. Mantere, 2005; Laine & Vaara, 2007; Mirabeau & Maguire, 2014). However, more research 
is needed to ascertain whether and how specific practices account for ephemeral strategy. Given 
the practical and theoretical importance of understanding why autonomous projects are not 
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implemented in an enduring way to become emergent strategy, our methodology can serve as the 
basis for research designed to identify and investigate the practices that produce ephemeral 
strategy. By combining our methodology for tracking strategy content with narrative and 
discourse analysis as well other methods (e.g. interviews, participant observation, ethnographies) 
that are commonly used in SP and SAP research to study how, why and by whom strategy 
content is made, researchers will be able to identify and explore the mechanisms through which 
specific content becomes ephemeral.  
As a first step, our methodology should be used to document the existence of autonomous 
strategic behaviour (since it is a precursor to ephemeral strategy). Our methodology does so by 
documenting intended strategy in terms of strategic categories and then identifying strategic 
projects that are dissonant with these categories, as well as capturing the nature of their 
dissonance. It is then important to establish an appropriate temporal threshold to operationalize 
and distinguish autonomous projects that endure, which represent emergent strategy, from 
autonomous projects that are fleeting, which represent ephemeral strategy. As previously 
mentioned, the relevant time period is expected to vary according to the industry under 
consideration. Having identified a given autonomous project that was fleeting, researchers then, 
in a second step, should collect and analyze data about the specific practices associated with it 
over its short life cycle by constructing the project’s practice history. This history might 
document the specific practices used to generate the autonomous strategic behavior manifested in 
the project, champion the project, mobilize resources, manipulate strategic context and alter 
structural context to accommodate the project, etc., depending upon the researcher’s focus. 
Subsequent analysis could then be carried out by comparing the practice histories of 
multiple fleeting autonomous projects to ascertain commonalities. If certain practices feature in 
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multiple short histories, they are likely to be implicated in the non-selection and non-retention of 
these projects and, hence, to account for the production of ephemeral strategy. To explore 
further, researchers could then construct practice histories for autonomous projects that endured 
to become emergent strategy, and compare them with those for the fleeting autonomous projects 
to ascertain differences. It is important to note that, since the interest is on ephemeral strategy, 
only the practice history from the early days of the enduring projects is relevant i.e., practices 
enacted prior to the temporal threshold used to declare the project an enduring one. If practices 
associated with the histories of fleeting projects making up ephemeral strategy are different from 
those associated with the early histories of enduring projects making up emergent strategy, then 
the case for concluding that the former lead to ephemeral strategy is strengthened. 
Another angle of investigation involves analyzing practice histories to examine 
interactions among projects by leveraging our methodology’s ability to highlight relations among 
different manifestations of strategy. As mentioned above, bottom-up autonomous projects and 
top-down induced projects may compete with each other for resources. If the latter are resourced 
and endure to become deliberate strategy, the former may be starved of resources and become 
ephemeral strategy. Our methodology allows researchers to identify induced projects that endure, 
for which practice histories can be constructed and compared with those of fleeting autonomous 
projects to reveal whether and how resource allocation practices shape the divergent fates of the 
induced and autonomous projects. In identifying projects associated with each manifestation of 
strategy, our methodology helps researchers to identify appropriate comparison projects whose 
practice histories will be most revelatory for understanding ephemeral strategy. 
Studying consequences of transient manifestations of strategy  
While it might be intuitive to conclude that unrealized and ephemeral strategy are 
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inconsequential because they are transient, these strategies can have longer-term effects. The 
frustration of prior strategic intent may shape subsequent strategic intent, while the abandonment 
of prior autonomous projects may influence the generation of subsequent ones. Insofar as 
researchers and practitioners wish to learn from and leverage the past, these consequences are 
important. In terms of the V-S-R framework, the key questions are the following. What are the 
consequences of the non-selection and/or non-retention of variation associated with top-down 
change projects on subsequent strategic intent? What are the consequences of the non-selection 
and/or non-retention of variation associated with bottom-up change projects on subsequent 
autonomous strategic behavior?  Our methodology is well-suited to addressing these questions. 
Having documented relationships among different manifestations of strategy during a given time 
period as detailed above, it can then be applied to succeeding time periods to document – at the 
level of finely-grained categories – the relationship of unrealized strategy to subsequent intended 
strategy, as well as the relationship of ephemeral strategy to subsequent autonomous strategic 
behavior. In this way, we are in a position to identify and investigate the consequences of 
transient manifestations of strategy for subsequent strategy making. 
Research in this area is sparse, but the concept of residuals of transient strategy content 
could be explored using our methodology. A study of strategic reversal found that an 
organization’s “sensemaking history” can contain “residuals” of prior strategy content “in the 
minds of individual employees” and this history influences employees’ interpretation and 
acceptance of subsequent strategy content (Mantere et al., 2012: 173). In promoting the intended 
merger of an independent service organization with its parent, practitioners engaged in both 
sensebreaking to delegitimize the status quo and sensegiving to rationalize and legitimate the 
change. The planned merger was then aborted and the change projects induced from it went 
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unrealized. However, the earlier sensebreaking and sensegiving could not be undone – the 
organization could not return to its original state prior to the intended, but unrealized, strategic 
change because the categories associated with strategic continuity had been discredited. Attempts 
to resuscitate them created anxiety and mistrust towards top managers who “had undermined 
their credibility as strategists and communicators” (Mantere et al., 2012: 188). This study 
highlights how practices of sensebreaking and sensegiving can serve as a mechanism whereby 
the content of an intended strategy that is unrealized in a given time period can, nonetheless, 
influence subsequent top-down strategy making.  
Ephemeral strategy may also leave residuals that shape subsequent bottom-up strategy 
making. For example, in their typology of organizational actors who block change initiatives, 
Armbruster et al. (2013: 484) identify “historians” who sabotage change projects with arguments 
of the following form: “We tried that already and it did not work”. In other words, in local 
contexts, failed efforts to mobilize resources, manipulate strategic context and alter structural 
context do not go unnoticed and, hence, can leave residuals despite their transient nature. In this 
way, ephemeral strategy in one time-period may shape the autonomous strategic behavior in 
subsequent time periods by inhibiting the recycling of specific content. 
Research agenda  
The SAP literature provides us with a preliminary idea of how transient manifestations of 
strategy, despite their fleeting nature, may affect subsequent strategy making through residuals. 
Of particular interest here is SAP research on strategy as narrative and rhetorical histories which 
highlight that events in the past can be made to be consequential because of how they are 
interpreted (e.g., Fenton & Langley, 2011; Suddaby et al., 2010), even if they are fleeting 
(Mantere et al., 2012). However, more research is needed to explore residuals or ascertain 
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whether transient manifestations of strategy have other consequences. Given the practical and 
theoretical importance of understanding how the past – or, more importantly, its interpretation 
and construction as ‘history’ (Suddaby et al., 2010) – shapes the future in strategy making, our 
methodology can serve as the basis for such research. By combining our methodology for 
tracking strategy content with the narrative and rhetorical methods used by SAP scholars to 
explore how histories of strategy making shape subsequent strategy making, as well as with other 
methods (e.g. interviews, participant observation, ethnographies and discourse analysis) used to 
study how, why and by whom strategy content is made, researchers will be able to explore how 
particular processes and practices shape the consequences of transient manifestations of strategy. 
As a first step, our methodology should be used to document instances of unrealized and 
ephemeral strategy in a given period, and to characterize them in terms of fleeting projects for 
which practice histories could be constructed, as described above. Longitudinal studies of 
strategy making following this period could then be undertaken to ascertain whether and how the 
fleeting projects making up unrealized and ephemeral strategy shape the subsequent production 
of intended strategy and autonomous strategic behavior respectively. Our methodology would 
then be re-applied to document the content of intended strategy following an instance of 
unrealized strategy and/or the content of autonomous strategic behavior following an instance of 
ephemeral strategy. In this way, effects of transient manifestations of strategy and how they 
come about can be established and theorized.  
CONCLUSION 
This paper explores the intersection of SP and SAP research by focusing on the focal 
phenomenon they share – strategy – which is a complex, multifaceted concept carrying multiple 
meanings that manifests itself in multiple ways. One way to bridge SP and SAP scholarship, we 
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argue, is through analyses of processes and practices as they relate to strategy content since both 
streams of research make important contributions to understanding the particular strategies that 
get made in organizations, how, and by whom. Accordingly, both traditions can benefit from 
documenting different manifestations when studying the making of strategy. To deal with the 
methodological challenges facing researchers in studying the full range of strategy 
manifestations, we have developed a novel, systematic and integrated methodology that is unique 
in its capacity to track specific empirical strategy content and map it to all six manifestations in a 
single study. In doing so, we address the concern of Ketchen and colleagues (2008: 654) that 
“although the execution and implementation of strategy are important issues to organizations and 
theorists alike, we appear to lack methods that fully capture these processes”. Further, in making 
tight connections to the six manifestations, and in highlighting the temporal and conceptual 
relations among them, our methodology overcomes “the weak interconnection between research 
streams focused on theory development and testing and those focused on methodological 
advances” (Venkatraman, 2008: 793). Finally, in being systematic and transparent, the 
methodology can help researchers to ensure construct validity, which “refers to the extent to 
which a study investigates what it claims” and which is important for ensuring rigorous 
qualitative case-study research (Gibbert & Ruigrok, 2010: 712).  
Our methodology is particularly well suited for investigating transient manifestations of 
strategy, which pose significant methodological challenges and have been under-theorized to 
date. We illustrate how researchers can overcome the limitations of existing methods in 
exploring transient manifestations by combining our methodology with the evolutionary 
perspective and the literature on strategy practices. In this way, we make a conceptual 
contribution by theorizing practices that give rise to transient top-down and bottom-up 
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variations, as well as the consequences of their non-selection and non-retention for subsequent 
strategy making. We lay out three research agendas using our methodology to broaden our 
understanding of transient manifestations, setting the stage for future empirical research. 
Studies of unrealized and ephemeral strategy have much to offer scholars, as well as 
practitioners. A better understanding of practices giving rise to so-called ‘failed’ strategy making 
will provide insight into how to ensure the success of both top-down and bottom-up strategy 
making. Perhaps less obvious, but equally important, is challenging the idea that these transient 
manifestations inherently constitute failure. For example, Noda and Bower’s (1996) case study 
of an ephemeral strategy in a telecommunications company showed its positive consequences for 
subsequent strategy making in galvanizing managers to pursue international wireless licences 
and broadband/multimedia opportunities. Ephemeral strategy may also be viewed positively as 
the price to pay for experimentation. Dyer and Gross (2001) suggest as much in their discussion 
of Dow Corning, many of whose forays into areas outside its intended strategy apparently failed, 
but nonetheless sustained other breakthroughs. In other words, managers may cultivate a stock of 
autonomous projects in full knowledge that some will become ephemeral in order to ensure that 
an adequate quantity and diversity of variations are available for selection. Future research 
should explore in more depth the consequences of non-selection and non-retention of both top-
down and bottom-up variations, which, a priori, are neither negative nor positive. 
Our integrated methodology therefore adds considerable value for researchers wishing to 
conduct comprehensive, systematic research on multiple manifestations of strategy and/or focus 
on one or both of the transient manifestations. It also has potential for researchers wishing to 
focus on other individual manifestations of strategy because, while we acknowledge that 
executing and integrating the three stages of our methodology may be cumbersome and not 
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suitable for all studies, the methodology is flexible enough to deal with situations where only one 
stage is required. Researchers only interested in intended strategy can document it 
comprehensively using the first stage, while those only interested in realized strategy can 
document it comprehensively using the second, although we still suggest they may derive more 
insight from relating the manifestation in which they are interested to other ones, which requires 
all three stages of our methodology. It is, however, important to underline that the methodology, 
in documenting what strategy content gets made, is complementary to – and not a substitute for – 
existing methods used by SP and SAP researchers to explore questions of how, why and by whom 
this content is made. Interviews, participant observation, ethnographies, research diaries, 
discourse analysis, and so forth remain invaluable methods for studying strategy processes and 
practices.  
Our methodology could also make an important contribution to researchers interested in 
connecting other strategy constructs to strategy content over time. For example, strategy research 
has explored how strategists’ beliefs and cognitions shape the evolution of firm capabilities and 
resources, which have been tracked over time using archival and interview data (e.g. Tripsas & 
Gavetti, 2000; Danneels, 2010). By combining our methodology to document strategy content 
over time with traditional methods that document the evolution of beliefs, cognitions, 
capabilities, and/or resources, researchers could explore whether and how patterns of continuity 
or change in one or more of these constructs relate to the evolution of strategy content over time. 
Thus, our methodology and existing methods complement each other in helping strategy 
researchers to connect strategy processes and practices, as well as other strategy constructs, to 
specific strategy content in empirical studies. 
In conclusion, SP and SAP researchers can use our integrated methodology to advance a 
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shared agenda by combining insights to explore multiple manifestations of strategy, the practices 
giving rise to them, and their consequences. It also opens up further opportunities for bridging. 
There is scope to build upon SAP work on discourse, resistance and political dynamics to shed 
light on the V-S-R framework and its implications for practitioners: various forms of discourse 
may not only delimit the range of variations ‘sayable’ and therefore possible, but may also affect 
how ‘variations’ come to be defined as such in praxis; the selection of projects for resourcing 
seems likely to involve political struggle among actors; and attempts to retain projects by altering 
strategic and structural context seem likely to run into resistance. In this way, our methodology 
and the research agenda can facilitate dialogue between these two important traditions and 
broaden our vision of what strategy is, as well as deepen our understanding of it. 
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
Table 1: An integrated methodology for the study of manifestations of strategy 
 
Stage Description Manifestation of Strategy  
Stage 1: Tracking 
strategy as discourse 
Tracking strategic categories (cf. Burgelman, 1983) at 
three levels (corporate, business, operational) for each 
time period 
1. Intended strategy 
Stage 2: Tracking 
strategy as action 
Tracking activities (projects, cf. Kaplan, 2011) over time 
and identifying those that endure 
4. Realized strategy 
Stage 3: Analyzing 
consonance and 
dissonance 
Comparing discourse and action by assessing consonance 
between individual strategic categories and projects; 
classifying projects as induced or autonomous (cf. 
Mirabeau & Maguire, 2014) 
2. Deliberate strategy  
3. Unrealized strategy 
5. Emergent strategy 
6. Ephemeral strategy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Six manifestations of strategy (adapted from Mirabeau & Maguire, 2014) 
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Figure 2: Strategic categories over time 
 
Legend 
SC = array of strategic categories for all time periods covered by the study 
T = total number of time periods covered by the study 
Ci = ith strategic category related to corporate strategy 
I = total number of strategic categories related to corporate strategy 
Bj = jth strategic category related to business strategy 
J = total number of strategic categories related to business strategy 
Fk = kth strategic category related to operational strategy 
K = total number of strategic categories related to operational strategy 
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Figure 3: Illustration of different manifestations of strategy 
(adapted from Mirabeau & Maguire, 2014) 
 
Legend 
Pr = rth strategic project  
tir = time period of inception of rth strategic project 
ter = time period of end of rth strategic project 
 
